What caused the First World War?

Cambridge IGCSE History 0470 · Paper 1 Section A, Core Content Option A Syllabus: 2027 and 2028 Option A: The nineteenth century: the development of modern nation states, 1848 to 1914 Key Question 6 of six

This is the last Key Question in Option A, and it is the only one that ends in 1914 rather than starting there. It asks what made a European war possible and then what made it actual, and it stops at the outbreak. Nothing about the fighting, the trenches, the armistice or the peace settlement belongs in an answer to it.

If you came here looking for the Schlieffen Plan in practice, the Western Front or the Treaty of Versailles, you are one line from the right page: section 2 says exactly where each of those lives.

The whole of this file is built around Cambridge's four focus points, because each of them is a ready made 10 mark essay title and because the papers set them in very unequal proportions. Section 3 shows which.

1. What the syllabus actually asks

This is the wording printed in the Cambridge IGCSE History 0470 syllabus for 2027 and 2028. Learn the Key Question itself: examiners build the 10 mark part directly out of it, series after series.

Key Question 6

What caused the First World War?

Focus points

• Did the Alliance System and global diplomacy make war more likely or less likely?
• How far did colonial problems create tensions between the Great Powers?
• Why were problems in the Balkans so difficult for the Great Powers to solve?
• How did the assassination of Franz Ferdinand lead to war?

Specified content

• The origins of the First World War, 1890 to 1914:
• the Alliance System and the European diplomatic system
• the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance
• the arms race
• colonial rivalries
• developments in the Balkans
• the crisis of June to July 1914 and the outbreak of war

Cambridge prints the date ranges and the compound name with dashes. The wording is otherwise exactly as above, and nothing has been added to it or left out.

Follow the dates in the specified content, not the dates in the option title. The Option A header reads 1848 to 1914, but this Key Question's specified content carries its own range: 1890 to 1914. Cambridge is telling you where to start, and it is forty two years later than the option header. Nothing before 1890 is required here, which is why Bismarck's alliance system, the Congress of Berlin and the Dreikaiserbund do not appear anywhere below. The one exception Cambridge itself makes is the Triple Alliance of 1882, which it names and dates in its own mark schemes because the bloc it created was still standing in 1914.

Read the focus points as arguments, not as a list

Cambridge defines its own three layers: key questions define the over-arching issues, focus points identify the issues that enable candidates to gain an understanding of the key question, and specified content provides guidance on what needs to be studied.

So the four focus points are not four chunks of content to memorise in turn. They are four arguments, each of which has two sides, and each of which has been set as a real 10 mark question.

Notice the first focus point is phrased as a genuinely open question, "more likely or less likely". Cambridge means it. The mark schemes credit the argument that the alliances were defensive and were meant to deter, and they credit the argument that they turned a Balkan quarrel into a war of six powers. An answer that only knows one of those two is a one sided answer before it starts.

What is new for 2027, and where the past papers cannot help you

Two items in the wording above are barely visible in the past paper record.

The 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance is named in the specified content, but of the 48 Paper 1 mark schemes read for these notes, covering 2018 to 2024, it appears in exactly one: February and March 2024, inside a 4 mark question on how Britain ended its policy of splendid isolation. There is no mark scheme depth on it to lean on. Learn it as part of the sequence in section 4 and do not expect a textbook's worth of examiner guidance.

"Global diplomacy" in the first focus point points the same way: outward, past the two European blocs. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention are the concrete content behind that phrase.

2. Where this Key Question stops

This is the boundary that examiner reports catch candidates crossing, so it is worth fixing before any revision.

The war itself is not here. The Schlieffen Plan in practice, the advance through Belgium, Mons and the Marne, trenches, Verdun, the Somme, Jutland, Gallipoli, the German offensive of 1918, the Kiel Mutiny, the abdication of the Kaiser and the Armistice are all Depth Study A: The First World War, 1914 to 1918. That is Section B of the paper, a different question, and none of it earns anything in Section A.

The Schlieffen Plan is the one genuinely shared item, and the split is clean. Its existence is a cause and belongs here: Cambridge set a whole 10 mark question on it in June 2018. Its failure is Depth Study A.

The peace is not here either. The Treaty of Versailles, war guilt, reparations, the Big Three and German reactions to the settlement are Option B Key Question 1, covered in the Was the Treaty of Versailles fair? notes. That is the other Core Content option entirely. On a real paper you answer two questions from Section A, so a candidate could sit this question and that one, but they are separate answers and they share no material.

The examiner report for June 2018 names the drift in one sentence, on a question about tension between the Great Powers before 1914: some responses focused on tension after 1914, which is not relevant. On the same series, another part asked about Germany before 1914 and some candidates wrote about Germany under Nazi rule from 1933.

3. How Paper 1 marks this Key Question

The ladders are the same for every question on this paper and are set out in the How Cambridge marks History 0470 Paper 1 notes: the three parts and their marks, the assessment objective split, and the two rules Cambridge changed for the 2024 series. Read that page once. Nothing below repeats it.

What is specific to this Key Question is where it sits and what shape of question it attracts.

It is always Question 4

Of the 48 Paper 1 mark schemes from 2018 to 2024, 31 set a question on the causes of the First World War, and all 31 set it as Question 4. Not one paper in the corpus placed it anywhere else. Questions 1 to 4 are Option A and 5 to 8 are Option B, so Question 4 is the last of the Option A four.

The other 17 papers gave Question 4 to Key Question 5, the imperialism topic, or to Key Question 4, the American Civil War. So it is not on every paper. Three whole series in the corpus set no causes-of-the-war question on any variant: June 2020, November 2022 and November 2023, and June 2024 as well. Against that, all three variants carried it in November 2018, June 2019, November 2020, June 2021, June 2022, June 2023 and November 2024.

Two consequences. You cannot count on it appearing, so you need a second Option A topic ready. And when it does appear it is Question 4, so you will find it at the end of your option, not scattered.

The 10 mark part is a blame question far more often than anything else

The 31 ten mark questions in the corpus break down like this.

That last row is the surprise, and it changes how you revise. The Balkans is one of the four focus points, but in seven years of papers it was the subject of a 10 mark question only once, in March 2018. Everywhere else it appears as the counterweight: rivalry over Morocco "rather than over the Balkans", quarrels over Morocco "than were the Balkan Wars". So Balkan material is worth knowing precisely, but train yourself to deploy it as the other side of somebody else's argument rather than as a topic you present.

The blame questions rotate the accused rather than the question. Across the corpus Cambridge has asked whether the responsible party was Austria, Germany, Russia, Serbia, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Tsar Nicholas II, the Alliance System, the arms race, the Schlieffen Plan, the Austrian ultimatum or the assassination itself. Prepare a paragraph on each of the powers, not one essay on "who was to blame", and you can answer any of them.

The reports on this content are unusually thin, and that is worth knowing

Across the 18 Principal Examiner reports in the corpus, the Option A questions are dealt with as a block 31 times with a sentence of the form: there were too few responses to these questions for meaningful comments to be made. Individual comment on Question 4 survives in only six paper sections, all of them in the 2018 and 2019 series.

Meanwhile Question 5, the first Option B question, is described repeatedly as the most popular question in the Core Content. Option A is the minority choice worldwide by a wide margin.

That has one practical effect on you. There is not much examiner commentary on this content, so the six sections that exist are worth more than usual. Section 8 sets out everything they say.

4. Focus point: did the Alliance System and global diplomacy make war more likely or less likely?

What the two blocs actually were

The Triple Alliance, formed in 1882, was Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Cambridge's own mark schemes state its terms:

• Each of the three promised mutual support if attacked by another great power.
• Germany and Austria would help Italy if it were attacked without provocation.
• Italy would help Germany if it were attacked by France.
• If there was a war between Austria and Russia, Italy would stay neutral.
• Germany promised to support Italian colonial ambitions in North Africa.
• Its terms were meant to be kept secret until 1919.

Italy's motive was fear of France, not affection for Germany. Cambridge credits Italy having been denied Tunisia, which France seized in 1881, and having been denied influence in Algeria, alongside the wish to sit among great powers.

The Triple Entente was Britain, France and Russia, and it came into being in 1907. The single most useful thing Cambridge prints about it is that it was not an alliance: a mark scheme lists "It was not an alliance" and "It was a friendly agreement between countries" as creditable 4 mark points, and elsewhere credits "In the Triple Entente, Britain was not bound to help Russia" and "Some of the alliances did not bind allies to defend each other" as valid points on the other side of a 10 mark argument. Cambridge also credits the point that Russia was not allied with Serbia.

That asymmetry is the whole argument. A candidate who writes that the alliances mechanically dragged everyone in has written a story that the paperwork does not support, and Cambridge will reward the candidate who notices.

Global diplomacy: how Britain stopped standing alone

Cambridge sets this as a 4 mark question in its own right, on how Britain ended its policy of splendid isolation. The sequence it credits:

• British negotiations with Germany as a balance against French and Russian power.
• The Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902.
• The Anglo-French Entente signed in 1904, the Entente Cordiale.
• The 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention.
• These agreements became known as the Triple Entente.
• In the 1911 Agadir Crisis, Britain backed France against Germany.
• Britain became committed to support France if it was attacked.

Read that as a story about how a country ends up on a side without ever signing up to a war. Each step is separately reasonable. Together they are the second bloc.

The case that the alliances made war more likely

Cambridge's own Level 3 exemplar runs the mechanism in full: the main powers of Europe were divided into two alliances, so a dispute between one country on one side and one on the other could drag in the rest, and in 1914 it did. When Austria declared war on Serbia, Germany joined Austria; because of Austria's actions Russia began to mobilise; that led Germany to declare war on Russia; that brought France in; Germany's declaration of war on France then led to Britain declaring war on Germany.

1. Europe splits into two blocs
2. any two-power quarrel now has four more powers contractually attached
3. a local Balkan dispute in July 1914 becomes a war of six powers

Three other threads Cambridge credits on this side:

• Secrecy. Mark schemes credit that many alliances contained secret clauses which increased international tension and suspicion. You cannot reassure a rival about a treaty you will not show them.
• Encirclement. Cambridge credits the point that the Germans considered themselves surrounded by the Triple Entente. Whether or not that was true, it shaped what Germany did.
• War plans. The Schlieffen Plan meant Germany would strike quickly at the start of a war to prevent fighting on two fronts. Cambridge's exemplar makes the causal point rather than the military one: the very existence of the plan showed Germany had already identified France and Russia as its enemies.

1. Germany plans for a two-front war
2. the plan requires striking France first and fast
3. a crisis in the east now produces an invasion in the west
4. a Balkan quarrel reaches the Channel

The case that they made war less likely, or did not cause it

• The alliances were defensive in wording. The Triple Alliance terms above are all conditional on being attacked.
• The Entente was not binding. Britain was not obliged to fight for Russia, and Russia was not obliged to fight for Serbia. Both did anyway. That points the blame at decisions, not documents.
• Cambridge's own alternative exemplar for a 10 mark question on this focus point blames the mistakes and misjudgements of the leaders: Britain failed to make its position clear, which fed Germany's misjudgement that Britain would stay out, which is part of why Germany gave Austria the blank cheque; Austria then gambled that it could beat Serbia before Russia could act. Cambridge calls that gamble a big mistake by German and Austrian leaders, and it is a Level 3 explanation on the other side.

Judgement material. The alliances did not oblige the powers that fought, and they did not oblige them in the direction they moved. What the alliances did was tell every government in advance who would probably be standing where, which made each of them bolder in a crisis rather than more careful.

5. Focus point: how far did colonial problems create tensions between the Great Powers?

Cambridge almost never asks this focus point on its own. It asks it against the naval race, and you should revise the two together because eleven of the thirty one 10 mark questions pit them against each other or against Morocco.

Weltpolitik

Cambridge defines it in a 4 mark mark scheme as the foreign policy of Germany, the policy of turning Germany into a global power, German imperialist foreign policy, and the policy of Germany acquiring an empire. The Kaiser wanted a place in the sun and wanted Germany's presence abroad to match its new industrial might.

Its effects, as Cambridge lists them: it was seen as an aggressive policy by other European states; Germany started to build a navy which alarmed Britain; Britain built Dreadnoughts in response; the policy drove France and Britain closer through the Entente Cordiale; German interference in Morocco alarmed France; German ambitions for an empire in Africa were seen as a threat by Britain. Germany colonised South West Africa, the Cameroons and Togoland.

1. Germany industrialises late and has no empire to match
2. Weltpolitik demands colonies and a navy to reach them
3. Britain reads the navy as aimed at itself
4. Britain moves toward France and Russia
5. the second bloc forms

That chain is the answer to the focus point, and notice where it lands: colonial ambition produced its damage through the naval race and through driving Britain and France together, not directly.

The scramble, as Cambridge describes it

After 1870 European nations began acquiring colonies in Africa. Cambridge credits France and Italy quarrelling over Tunis, France and Germany over Morocco, Britain in the south and dominant in Egypt and the Sudan, France focused on Morocco, Tunisia and the Sahara, Belgium in the Congo, Portugal in Mozambique and Angola, Germany in south west Africa, Italy in Somalia and Eritrea, and France and Britain coming near to war over the Sudan in 1898. Cambridge also credits that Italy turned to Germany when it lost Tunis to France, and that colonial rivalry in Africa helped intensify the arms race.

The two Moroccan crises

1905 to 1906. The Entente Cordiale of 1904 had given France a free hand in Morocco. The Kaiser visited Tangier, rode around the city on a white horse, and declared that Morocco should be independent of France, claiming to support the sovereignty of the Sultan. Germany demanded an international conference. At the Algeciras Conference of 1906, German proposals were rejected. Only Austria-Hungary supported the Kaiser; Britain and France stood together. Cambridge lists the results: France and Britain formed a closer relationship, the Entente Cordiale was strengthened, the Sultan kept control of the police force in Morocco, the rights of Europeans to own land were established, Moroccan trade was opened to all nations, and Germany had to accept that the French and Spanish would police the ports.

1911. The Sultan of Morocco asked France for help to crush a revolt and the French responded with troops. Germany, reading this as an excuse for France to take control of all of Morocco, sent the gunboat Panther to Agadir. Britain thought Germany was after a naval base there. Lloyd George threatened that Britain was ready to stand up for its rights, and Britain threatened war if Germany did not withdraw. Germany accepted a French protectorate over Morocco in return for the French Congo.

1. the Kaiser intervenes in Morocco to split Britain from France
2. Britain backs France at Algeciras and again at Agadir
3. the Entente is tested and comes out stronger
4. Germany's own action produced the encirclement it feared

Cambridge sets the crises against each other directly, and it credits both answers. On one side, 1905 was more dangerous because Germany threatened war when France refused a conference. On the other, 1911 was more dangerous because it damaged relations between Britain and Germany specifically, and that was the fault line that mattered in 1914. Cambridge also credits the deflating readings as valid Level 2 points: in the first crisis Germany did not want war and never seriously considered it, and in the second Germany was bluffing.

The arms race and the naval race

Cambridge separates these. The arms race is general: military spending by European powers increased greatly, armies grew, and artillery and machine guns multiplied. Germany's Army Act of 1913 allowed it to expand its army, which numbered almost 1 million men by 1914 under Chief of Staff von Moltke. Cambridge also credits the cultural point that the arms race glorified militaristic culture in several countries.

The naval race is Anglo-German and specific:

• Germany built a High Seas Fleet under Admiral Tirpitz.
• The German Naval Law of 1900 called for the doubling of German battleships. In 1908 a further naval bill increased the number being built.
• In 1903 Britain began forming a North Sea fleet, and the Germans widened the Kiel Canal to take large battleships.
• In 1906 Britain launched the Dreadnought: bigger guns, greater range and accuracy, steam turbine propulsion for speed, armour plating Cambridge gives as 28 cm thick, and roughly twice the cost of a normal battleship. It made every existing warship obsolete, which meant Britain's lead was suddenly worth almost nothing.
• Germany started building dreadnoughts in 1907. Britain had 23 by 1914 and ended the race ahead.
• The German fleet threatened Britain's two power standard.

1. the Dreadnought makes all older battleships obsolete
2. Britain's huge existing lead is wiped out overnight
3. the race restarts from near zero and Germany can realistically compete
4. each side reads the other's building as preparation for war

That is the sharpest single chain in this topic, and it explains something students often get backwards: Britain's own innovation is what made the naval race close enough to be frightening.

Judgement material. Colonial rivalry and the naval race are not really rivals for the same job. Colonial ambition supplied the motive and the naval programme supplied the threat, and it was the threat that Britain answered. Cambridge's own top band exemplar comes down that way: naval rivalry mattered more than colonial rivalry because it caused a public outcry and made the British see Germany as a real threat.

6. Focus point: why were problems in the Balkans so difficult for the Great Powers to solve?

The focus point asks why they were difficult, not what happened. Answer the difficulty.

The structural problem

The Ottoman Empire was in serious decline, and Cambridge uses that phrase. Territory was coming loose in a region where two great powers had opposite interests. Austria-Hungary was a multinational empire that feared nationalism because nationalism, if it worked anywhere nearby, dissolved it. Cambridge puts it plainly: Austria was afraid its empire was disintegrating, and it saw Russian ambitions in the Balkans and Serb nationalism as its two big threats. Russia presented itself as protector of fellow Slavs and wanted influence over the Slavs inside Austria-Hungary too.

So the same fact, a strong independent Serbia, was a vital interest to one great power and an existential threat to the other. There was no settlement that gave both of them what they needed.

1. Ottoman power recedes
2. new Slav states form on Austria's border
3. every Serb success is a Russian gain and an Austrian danger
4. no compromise exists that satisfies both, so each crisis is postponed rather than solved

The Bosnian crisis, 1908 to 1909

Austria had gradually taken more control of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a new pro-Russian regime in Serbia wanted the provinces too. When Austria annexed them in 1908, Serbia protested strongly and mobilised its army, expecting Russian support. Russia was not ready for war, particularly against German military strength, and backed down. Cambridge credits the consequences directly: relations between Austria and Serbia were damaged, relations between Austria and Russia were damaged, Serbia was left looking for revenge, and Russia vowed it would not back down again.

That last point is the one that pays. It is the reason the 1914 crisis ran differently from the 1908 one.

The Balkan Wars, 1912 and 1913

The Balkan League was set up in 1912: Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, formed to expel the Turks from the Balkans and to limit Austrian power there. It went to war against the Ottoman Empire and won the First Balkan War, with Russian support. It broke up in 1913 when Bulgaria went to war against Serbia and Greece.

Cambridge's own mark schemes give the consequences: Serbia emerged much stronger and aimed at a union of southern Slav peoples; this frightened Austria, which turned further towards Germany; Turkey also looked to Germany and Austria; and the Second Balkan War destroyed the Balkan League, which had been Russia's defence against Austria, leaving Russia with Serbia as its only remaining ally there and therefore bound more tightly to it.

1. Serbia wins twice and grows
2. Austria concludes Serbia must be destroyed rather than managed
3. Russia loses the Balkan League and has only Serbia left
4. both great powers are now committed to opposite outcomes in the next crisis

A note on the size of Serbia's gain. Cambridge's own materials do not agree. One mark scheme says Serbia increased its territory by about 80 per cent; two others say Serbia had doubled or almost doubled in size. Do not try to reconcile them and do not pick a figure to defend. Write that Serbia grew very substantially, and if you want a number, say "by around 80 per cent" and move on. The mark is for the consequence, not the percentage.

Judgement material. The Balkans were difficult to solve because the great powers did not want the same kind of solution. Austria wanted the question closed permanently and Russia wanted it kept open, and each crisis that was settled peacefully was settled by one of them backing down, which made the next one harder to settle the same way.

7. Focus point: how did the assassination of Franz Ferdinand lead to war?

This focus point asks about a chain of decisions across five weeks. Cambridge's examiner reports say, in four separate places, that candidates answer it by narrating the day. Section 8 quotes them. The day is worth four marks once, on a 4 mark question that asks for it. Everywhere else it is the trap.

Who did it, and why

Gavrilo Princip was a Serb and a member of the Black Hand, which Cambridge describes as a secret Serbian nationalist society that spread anti-Austrian propaganda within Serbia, carried out sabotage and political murders, and was especially keen to prevent Austria-Hungary taking over parts of Serbia. Its membership included radicals, government officials, professionals and army officers. It decided to assassinate Franz Ferdinand because it saw him as a threat to Serbian independence, and three young Bosnians were recruited to carry it out. Princip hoped the killing would push Austria into giving up part of Bosnia, where 3 million Serbs lived, and he wanted a greater Serbia created.

Cambridge also sets the question through Young Bosnia, whose members opposed Bosnia being part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, wanted to free Bosnia and Herzegovina where many Slavs lived and which Austria had taken over a few years before, and wanted a new state for the south Slavs.

Both routes lead back to 1908. The motive for 1914 is the annexation of 1908, which is why the Balkans section above is not optional background.

The day, kept short

Franz Ferdinand went to Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 to review Austrian troops stationed in Bosnia. There were only 120 policemen on duty and he travelled in an open topped car. Cabrinovic threw a bomb which bounced off the Archduke's car and damaged the one behind, then swallowed poison which failed to work, and was arrested. Franz Ferdinand reached the Town Hall and cancelled the rest of the tour. On the way to the railway station his chauffeur took the wrong route and stopped to reverse. Princip, one of seven assassins, fired two shots and killed the Archduke and his wife. Both died within the hour. Princip was arrested.

That is the whole of it, and it is here only so you can write it in four lines when a 4 mark question asks for it. If the question is a 6 or a 10, this paragraph earns nothing.

The five weeks that turned a murder into a war

The blank cheque. Germany promised Austria full support whatever the outcome of its dealings with Serbia. Cambridge's own exemplars call this the pivot in both directions: Austria was initially hesitant and probably only wanted a local war, and German backing made a full scale European war much more likely because it meant the alliance system would come into play once Russia moved to support Serbia.

The ultimatum. Austria sent Serbia an ultimatum on 23 July 1914, making ten demands, with a 48 hour deadline. Cambridge's mark schemes are unambiguous about the intention: Austria sent terms it knew Serbia could not accept, wanting a quick local war it thought it would easily win, and had no intention of waiting out the deadline. Serbia accepted all the demands except one, refusing to let Austrian representatives investigate the assassination on Serbian soil. It made no difference.

The declarations. Austria declared war on Serbia on 28 July. Russia mobilised to defend Serbia. On 29 July Germany warned Russia not to intervene, and Russia ignored the warning. On 1 August 1914 Germany declared war on Russia, and moved its army towards France and Belgium the same day, putting the Schlieffen Plan into action. France was brought in by its alliance with Russia.

Britain. Cambridge sets a whole 10 mark question on why Britain entered, and credits both sides. By the Treaty of London of 1839 Britain had promised to defend Belgium, and the British government gave the German attack on Belgium as its reason for going to war. Cambridge notes that before the invasion British public opinion had been divided, and the German attack united it, which made the declaration easier for the government. Against that, Cambridge credits the argument that Belgium was an excuse and Britain fought for its empire, its trade, the balance of power, its Entente with France, and because of the naval race.

1. assassination 28 June
2. Germany's blank cheque removes Austria's caution
3. an unacceptable ultimatum on 23 July
4. Austria declares war on Serbia 28 July
5. Russia mobilises rather than repeat 1908
6. Germany declares war on Russia 1 August and marches west
7. Belgium is invaded and Britain enters

That single chain is the answer to this focus point. Learn the seven links and you can enter the argument at whichever one the question names.

The blame questions, and who Cambridge lets you accuse

Thirteen of the thirty one 10 mark questions are blame questions. Here is the case Cambridge itself prints for each defendant, so you can build a paragraph on each.

Austria. It was determined to crush Serbia, which by 1914 was the strongest Balkan state with a strong army and Russian backing. The ultimatum was designed to be refused and Austria had already decided on war.

Germany. Austria would never have declared war on Serbia without German support. The blank cheque gave Austria a free hand, and Germany knew Russia would come to Serbia's aid. Without it, Cambridge's own exemplar says, Austria might have taken more care not to provoke Russia.

Russia. Serbia would never have gone as far as it did without Russian support, and would have handled the ultimatum more carefully. Russia mobilised first, and Germany treated that mobilisation as a declaration of war.

Serbia. Serbia had been causing trouble for Austria for some time, and the Black Hand was involved in the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, which was bound to produce an Austrian response.

Britain. It failed to make its position clear, so Germany believed Britain would not intervene. Cambridge prints the German grievance as a creditable argument: Germany felt it had been tricked into war.

Nobody in particular. Cambridge's own material supports the reading that the crisis turned into war through mistakes and misjudgements rather than through any single decision to start it.

One warning specific to these questions. Cambridge sets some of them as narrow blame questions, for example whether Austria and Russia were equally to blame. The June 2019 report says a significant number of responses gave wider reasons for the outbreak when the question asked specifically about the roles of Austria and Russia. Answer the two named, and use the others only to weigh them.

8. What examiner reports say candidates get wrong on this content

These are the topic-specific faults, taken from the six report sections that comment on Question 4 individually. The faults that apply to any question on the paper are in the How Cambridge marks History 0470 Paper 1 notes and are not repeated here.

Narrating the assassination instead of answering. This is the single most repeated fault on this content, named in four separate report sections. On a 4 mark question about the Black Hand, some candidates gave relevant points and then wrote at length about the events on the day. On a 4 mark question about the July Crisis, weaker responses were characterised by lengthy descriptions of the events of the assassination. On a 6 mark question about why the Archduke was assassinated, many responses were narrative in approach, describing in depth the events of the day, and the report adds the general rule that part (b) answers always require explanation. On a 10 mark question about Austria and Russia, candidates wrote in considerable detail about the events of the day rather than focusing on the question set.

If you take one thing from this file: the day of the assassination is a 4 mark answer to one specific 4 mark question, and it is worthless everywhere else.

Confusing the Triple Alliance with the Triple Entente. Named twice. In one series weaker responses confused the two outright; in another, a small number of candidates gave incorrect details of which countries were in each alliance. Two lists, six countries. Learn them cold.

Bringing Morocco to a Balkan question. On a 6 mark question about the Bosnian crisis of 1908 to 1909, a number of candidates wrote about one or both of the Moroccan crises. The two are the most commonly paired topics in the 10 mark parts, which is exactly why they get swapped by mistake in the shorter parts.

Narrating Morocco instead of explaining it. On a 6 mark question about why the Kaiser became involved in Morocco, weaker responses gave a narrative of the 1905 or 1911 crises with little or no explanation of why he became involved.

Drifting past 1914, or into the wrong century. Both named in the same series. On a question about tension before 1914, some responses focused on tension after 1914. On a question about Germany before 1914, some candidates wrote about Germany under Nazi rule from 1933.

Generalising about the Alliance System. One report describes answers that state the Alliance System set countries against each other with no accompanying detail, and points to what was missing: the quarrel between Germany and France over Morocco, the Kaiser's jealousy of the extent of the British Empire, German fears of encirclement by the Triple Entente, and the way a dispute between one member of each bloc could escalate to involve all of them.

Listing causes rather than explaining them. One report describes candidates with sound knowledge of the causes of the war writing them as a list of reasons rather than explaining why they led to war. On this topic more than most, the temptation is to recite a memorised set of long and short term causes.

One sided answers on the Moroccan crises. One report says a 10 mark question on Morocco produced many one sided answers: candidates could describe the crises of 1905 and 1911 but were less confident about linking them to the threat to peace, and could not argue convincingly that they were one.

9. Judgement sentences for this Key Question

The tenth mark is a separate act, and it is one sentence. Each of these states a position and attaches a reason, which is what Level 5 asks for. Adapt the wording to the exact question.

• "The alliances did not cause the war, but they decided its size, because they turned a quarrel between two powers into a war of six."
• "Germany mattered more than Austria, because Austria's ultimatum was only possible once Germany had promised in advance to cover the consequences."
• "Colonial rivalry supplied the motive and the naval race supplied the threat, and it was the threat Britain answered, so the naval race did the greater damage."
• "The Balkans were impossible to settle because Austria needed the question closed and Russia needed it open, so every peaceful settlement simply moved the crisis forward."
• "Russia's decision in 1914 is explained by its humiliation in 1908, which means the Bosnian crisis did more to cause the war than the assassination did."
• "The assassination was the occasion rather than the cause, because everything that turned it into a war was decided in Berlin and Vienna in the weeks afterwards."
• "Britain went to war over Belgium in the sense that Belgium is what allowed it to, and over Germany in the sense that Germany is why it wanted to."

10. Quick revision

• It is always Question 4 on Paper 1, and it appears on about two papers in three. Three series in the corpus skipped it entirely.
• Triple Alliance, 1882: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy. Defensive terms, secret until 1919, Italy neutral in an Austro-Russian war.
• Triple Entente, 1907: Britain, France, Russia. Not an alliance. Britain not bound to help Russia; Russia not allied to Serbia.
• Britain leaves splendid isolation: Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902, Entente Cordiale 1904, Anglo-Russian Convention 1907, backs France at Agadir 1911.
• Weltpolitik: colonies, a navy, and a place in the sun. Its real effect was to drive Britain and France together.
• Morocco 1905 to 1906: Kaiser at Tangier, Algeciras Conference 1906, German proposals rejected, only Austria-Hungary supports him.
• Morocco 1911: the gunboat Panther at Agadir, Britain backs France, Germany takes the French Congo and accepts a French protectorate.
• Naval race: German Naval Law 1900, Britain's North Sea fleet 1903, Dreadnought 1906 makes all older ships obsolete, Germany builds them from 1907, further German naval bill 1908, Britain has 23 by 1914. Tirpitz, the High Seas Fleet, Britain's two power standard.
• Army: German Army Act of 1913, almost 1 million men by 1914, von Moltke Chief of Staff.
• Bosnia 1908: Austria annexes, Serbia mobilises, Russia backs down and vows never again. This is why 1914 ran differently.
• Balkan League 1912: Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro. Beats Turkey, breaks up in 1913. Serbia grows by around 80 per cent and Russia is left with Serbia alone.
• July Crisis: assassination 28 June, blank cheque, ultimatum 23 July with ten demands and 48 hours, Serbia accepts all but one, Austria declares war 28 July, Russia mobilises, Germany declares war on Russia 1 August and marches west, Belgium invaded, Britain enters on the Treaty of London of 1839.
• Schlieffen Plan: its existence is a cause and belongs here. Its failure is Depth Study A.
• Blame: prepare a paragraph on Austria, Germany, Russia, Serbia and Britain separately. The question rotates the accused.
• Never narrate the day of the assassination unless a 4 mark question asks for it.

11. Where these facts come from

Taken from Cambridge's own published 0470 materials, meaning the syllabus for 2027 and 2028, the Paper 1 mark schemes from 2018 to 2024, and the Principal Examiner reports from 2018 to 2024:

the Key Question, focus point and specified content wording; the Triple Alliance date of 1882 and every term listed for it; the Triple Entente date of 1907 and the statement that it was not an alliance; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, the Entente Cordiale of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907; Italy's loss of Tunisia in 1881; the definition and effects of Weltpolitik and the German colonies named; the Franco-British near war over the Sudan in 1898; the Tangier visit, the Algeciras Conference of 1906 and its listed results; the Panther at Agadir in 1911, the Lloyd George threat and the French Congo exchange; the German Naval Law of 1900, the North Sea fleet of 1903, the Dreadnought of 1906 with its 28 cm plating, Germany building dreadnoughts from 1907, the 1908 naval bill, the figure of 23 British dreadnoughts by 1914, Tirpitz, the High Seas Fleet, the Kiel Canal widening and the two power standard; the Army Act of 1913, the figure of almost 1 million men and von Moltke as Chief of Staff; the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 and Russia's climbdown; the Balkan League of 1912, its four members, its purpose and its collapse in 1913; the figure of 3 million Serbs in Bosnia; the composition and aims of the Black Hand and of Young Bosnia; the events in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 including the 120 policemen, Cabrinovic's bomb, the seven assassins and the two shots; the blank cheque; the ultimatum of 23 July with ten demands and a 48 hour deadline and Serbia's acceptance of all but one; the Austrian declaration of war on 28 July; the German warning to Russia on 29 July and the German declaration of war on Russia on 1 August; the Treaty of London of 1839; the description of the Schlieffen Plan as a plan to avoid a two front war; and every examiner report fault quoted in section 8.

Where Cambridge's own materials disagree, and you should not try to reconcile them:

• The German naval laws. One question stem dates the introduction of Weltpolitik to 1890, and two exemplar answers refer to Germany passing naval laws "as early as 1890". A different mark scheme names the German Naval Law of 1900. Another refers to Germany beginning to build up its navy "in the late 1890s". A fourth names Tirpitz's Navy Law of 1897. These cannot all be the same law. If you need a date in an explanation, use the one Cambridge states most plainly, the Naval Law of 1900, or avoid the date and explain the effect instead. The mark is for the effect.
• How much Serbia grew after the Balkan Wars. One mark scheme says about 80 per cent; two others say Serbia had doubled or almost doubled in size.

Not verified against the corpus, and therefore deliberately left out of the body above: the exact date on which Germany declared war on France, the exact date on which Britain declared war on Germany, the number of divisions or ships on either side, the text of any of the ten Austrian demands, and the full membership list of the Black Hand. None of these is needed for a top band answer on any question in the corpus.

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